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COMMENT
PAY EQUITY FOR INTERCOLLEGIATE
COACHES: EXPLORING THE EEOC
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES
I. INTRODUCTION
Since Marianne Stanley's 1993 lawsuit against the University of Southern
California for equal pay, there has been a tremendous increase in the attention
that both the courts and educational institutions are giving to the issue of
gender-based wage discrimination.1  Studies have shown that there are
substantial differences in the salaries paid to coaches of men's and women's
teams in educational institutions. According to the 1997 National Collegiate
Athletic Association's (NCAA) Gender Equity Study, women earn 40% of the
money spent on coaching in high schools and universities.2 At Division I
institutions, during the 1996-1997 academic year the highest salary paid to a
women's head basketball coach was $344,000 compared to $900,000 for a
men's basketball coach.3 The median salary for a women's head basketball
coach was $98,400, compared to $290,000 for a men's head basketball coach.4
Another study found that the average salary for coaches of Division I women's
teams in 2000 was $38,191, while the coaches of men's teams earned, on
average, $61,534. 5
Even where women's coaches receive an equal base salary, 6 coaches of
1. See Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1022
(1999) [hereinafter Stanley 1].
2. Andrea M. Giampetro-Meyer, Recognizing and Remedying Individual and Institutional
Gender-Based Wage Discrimination in Sport, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 343, 356 (2000). The following is a
list of average salaries for the coaches of men's and women's teams as reported to the NCAA in 1997
(as listed by sport/men's team coach's salary/women's team coach's salary):
Basketball/$99,283/$60,603; Baseball/Softball/ $41,879/$29,027; Gymnastics/$35,675/$38,593; Ice
Hockey/$64,214/$24,478; Lacrosse/$35,745/ $26,871; Rowing/$30,838/$22,623;
Soccer/$32,275/$27,791; Swimming/$28,121/$26,711; Track/ $27,271/$25,249. Id. at 355 n.67.
3. Gender Equity in Sports, Coaches: Salaries for Division I-A Men's and Women's Coaches
(1996-1997), available at http://bailiwick.lib.uiowa.edu/ge/statistics.htm#Coaches (last visited Nov.
18, 2002).
4. Id.
5. Jennifer Jacobson, Female Coaches Lag in Pay and Opportunities to Oversee Men's Teams,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 8, 2001, at A38.
6. Betty Jaynes, CEO of the Women's Basketball Coaches Association (WBCA), estimates that
base salaries are equal in less than 10% of Division I institutions. Vicki Michaelis, Women Coaches
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men's teams often receive greater benefits. "A U.S. General Accounting
Office (GAO) survey, for example, found that head coaches for women's
basketball earned 25% of the average additional benefits earned by head
coaches for men's basketball, including such benefits as housing assistance,
free transportation, free tickets to sporting events, and club memberships." 7
As a result of these pay disparities there has been an increase in lawsuits by
female intercollegiate coaches alleging gender-based wage discrimination
claims.
The purpose of this comment is to examine the legal issues involved in
intercollegiate coaches' pay equity claims and explore how the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Guidelines may benefit
female coaches bringing gender-based wage discrimination claims. These
Guidelines clarify how the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA) and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 apply to gender-based differences in the coaches'
salaries by setting forth a detailed legal analysis of how the EEOC interprets
EPA and Title VII claims and by providing factual illustrations of unequal pay
scenarios that may or may not violate these statutes.8 Part II of this comment
will outline the federal statutes under which pay equity claims may be
asserted. Part III will summarize key gender-based wage discrimination cases
brought by intercollegiate female coaches. Part IV will examine the EEOC
Guidelines, the impact that they may have on coaches pay equity claims, and
the implications that they raise for educational institutions. Finally, Part V
sets forth recommendations to help strengthen a coach's pay equity claim.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
There are three federal statutes under which a claim of gender-based wage
discrimination can be brought: (1) the Equal Pay Act of 1963,9 (2) Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,10 and (3) Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972.11
Far from Achieving Equal Pay, DENVER POST, Dec. 8, 1998, at D12.
7. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC Notice No. 915.002:
Enforcement Guidance on Sex Discrimination in the Compensation of Sports Coaches in Educational
Institutions, EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH), Oct. 29, 1997, at I, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/coaches.html [hereinafter EEOC Guidelines].
8. Id
9. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2000).
11. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
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A. The Equal Pay Act
The EPA prohibits employers from paying employees at a wage less than
employees of the opposite sex at the same place of employment "for equal
work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions ... ."12 The plaintiff does not have to prove that the jobs are
identical, but rather "substantially equal."
13
The first step in establishing a prima facie case is for the plaintiff to
identify a specific comparator. 14 The comparator must be an identifiable
person of the opposite sex who earned a higher salary for performing a
substantially equal job.15 The plaintiff must compare himself or herself to this
person and show that the comparator earned a higher wage for a substantially
equal job.16 To determine if a job is substantially equal, four elements are
considered: equal skills, equal effort, equal responsibility, and equal working
conditions. 17
First, in order to determine equal skills, factors such as "'experience,
training, education, and ability' are considered. 18 These skills are to be
measured based on the "performance requirements of the job."'19 Any training,
education or abilities "that are not required to perform the job will not be
considered in determining whether the jobs are substantially equal." 20  To
determine equal effort, one looks at the actual job requirements to determine if
the coaching jobs require equal effort.21 When assessing equal responsibility,
the actual duties of the coaches are examined to determine if differences in
responsibility warrant unequal pay. 22 Relevant factors include "the size of the
team, the number of assistants, and the demands of event and media
management. '23 Finally, the EPA assumes that coaches have similar working
conditions when the jobs performed require equal skill, effort and
12. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
13. EEOC Guidelines, supra note7, at II (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1620.13(a) (2002)).
14. Id. at II.A.1.
15. Id.
16. Id. at II.A.2.
17. Id. at II.A.2.a-d.
18. Id. at II.A.2.a (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1620.15(a) (2002)).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at II.A.2.b.
22. Id. at II.A.2.c.
23. Id.
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responsibility. 24
Once the plaintiff identifies a comparator, shows the jobs are substantially
equal, and proves that he or she is paid less, he or she has established a prima
facie case of discrimination and the burden shifts to the employer to prove one
of the Act's four exceptions apply. Under the EPA, disparity in pay is
acceptable if it is based on: "'(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a
differential based on any other factor other than sex."' 25  Educational
institutions often successfully defend unequal pay claims brought under the
EPA by asserting that the pay differential is based on a "factor other than
sex." 26 If the defendant cannot prove that the pay disparity falls within one of
the EPA's four affirmative defenses, it is liable.27 A plaintiffs remedy under
the EPA is two years back pay28 and "an additional amount equal to back pay
as liquidated damages in cases in which the employer failed to show good
faith."29
B. Title VII
A claim of unequal pay for equal work can be brought under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in addition to the EPA. Title VII prohibits an
employer from discriminating against employees in a protected class,
including sex, in the terms and conditions of employment.30 Title VII is
broader than the EPA because it protects all aspects of employment, not just
wage discrimination. 31 In addition, Title VII does not require the jobs to be
substantially equal.32
While the requirements for a general Title VII claim are clear, the
elements of a prima facie pay equity claim under Title VII are unsettled. 33
Generally, if the only discrimination asserted under Title VII is an equal pay
24. Id. at II.A.2.d.
25. Barbara Osborne & Marilyn V. Yarbrough, Pay Equity For Coaches and Athletic
Administrators: An Element of Title IX?, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 231, 239 (2000) (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)).
26. Id.
27. Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 2, at 359.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 359-60.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
31. Mel Narol & Joseph A. Martin, A New Defense to the Old Defenses? The EEOC Equal Pay
Act Guidelines, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 175, 177 (1998).
32. Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 2, at 360.
33. Narol & Martin, supra note 31, at 178.
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violation, the court will analyze it using the EPA framework. 34 For Title VII
unequal pay claims, the plaintiffs burden of proof is the same as under the
EPA, and all the defenses available under the EPA apply as well. 35 However,
if sex discrimination beyond unequal pay is alleged, the traditional Title VII
framework is applied to analyze the claim.
36'
To establish a prima facie case under Title VII, the plaintiff must show
that: "(1) [she] is a member of a protected class; (2) [she] was qualified for and
occupied a particular position; (3) despite [her] qualifications, [she] was
treated less favorably than [her male] counterpart; and (4) the circumstances
[of the treatment] gave rise to an inference of. [unlawful] discrimination." 37
The burden then shifts to the defendant to show a nondiscriminatory reason for
the differential treatment. 38 Finally, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to
show that discrimination was actually the basis for the reason stated by the
employer.39
A plaintiff may wish to bring a Title VII claim rather than an EPA claim
because the jobs do not need to be substantially equal and the plaintiff may
recover up to $300,000 in compensatory damages, plus punitive damages and
attorney's fees.40
C. Title IX
Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 prohibits discrimination
on the basis of sex in any program or activity that receives federal financial
assistance. 41 The operation of educational institutions is included in the terms
"program" and "activity. ' 42
Title IX regulations specifically address compensation.43 The relevant
regulations provide that "the institution may not make or enforce policies or
practices which distinguish wages or other compensation on the basis of
gender, or result in such distinctions for equal work on jobs which require
'equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
34. Id.
35. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 7, at ILB.I.
36. Narol & Martin, supra note 31, at 178.
37. Id. at 177.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 178.
41. 20U.S.C. § 1681.
42. Id. § 1687 (2000).
43. 34 C.F.R. § 106.54 (2002).
2002]
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working conditions.' ' 44
It appears that the EPA framework for analyzing wage discrimination
claims is incorporated by Title IX.4 5
When assessing whether an athletic program is in compliance with Title
IX, the compensation of coaches is a relevant factor.46 There is a violation of
this section only where one can show that the coach's compensation "denies
male and female athletes coaching of an equivalent quality, nature or
availability. '47
While the statute does not expressly provide for a private suit for damages,
the Supreme Court has held that Title IX implies a private right of action.
48
However, the courts disagree as to whether Title IX is applicable to cases of
employment discrimination. In Lakoski v. James,49 the Fifth Circuit held that
"Title VII 'provides the exclusive remedy for individuals alleging employment
discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded educational institutions,'
thereby preempting claims brought pursuant to Title IX.' '50 Other courts
disagree, allowing Title IX claims and holding that the Title VII framework
should be applied to Title IX claims. 51
When bringing a Title IX unequal pay claim, coaches must assert that the
difference in compensation is due to the sex of the team coached rather than
the sex of the coach. 52 Under this theory, either a male or female coaching a
women's team could bring a claim, alleging that the pay disparity was
discrimination based on coaching a women's team. However, if a coach is
claiming that his or her unequal salary is discrimination based upon gender,
the claim should be brought under either the EPA or Title VII. While a brief
overview of Title IX has been provided, the focus of this comment is on
gender-based wage discrimination claims brought under either the EPA or
Title VII.
44. Janet Judge et al., Pay Equity: A Legal and Practical Approach to the Compensation of
College Coaches, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 549, 557 (1996) (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 106.54(b)).
45. Id.
46. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(6) (2002).
47. Judge, supra note 44, at 558 (emphasis omitted).
48. Id. at 559 & n.59 (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992)).
49. 66 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 947 (1996).
50. Judge, supra note 44, at 559 (quoting Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 753).
51. Id; see also Terry W. Dodds, Equal Pay in College Coaching: A Summary of Recent
Decisions, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 319, 324 n.35 (2000).
52. Cathryn L. Claussen, Title IX and Employment Discrimination in Coaching Intercollegiate
Athletics, 12 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 149, 150 (1994).
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III. CASE LAW EVALUATING INTERCOLLEGIATE COACH PAY
EQUITY CLAIMS
In recent years female coaches have relied on one or more of the above
federal statutes to bring claims of gender-based wage discrimination against
defendant universities and athletic directors. This section will summarize the
key cases to better understand how courts are evaluating pay equity claims
brought by intercollegiate coaches.
A. Stanley v. University of Southern California5 3
Marianne Stanley is the former women's basketball coach at the
University of Southern California (USC). Her lawsuit against USC alleging
violations of the EPA, Title IX, and California law is regarded as the most
significant case to address pay inequality for female collegiate coaches. 54
Stanley's dispute with USC has produced two decisions by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
In Stanley J,55 the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's denial of
Stanley's motion for a preliminary injunction, stating that Stanley had failed to
show a likelihood of success on the merits of her claim for pay equity.56 This
suit arose after Stanley's contract was not renewed by USC following
unsuccessful contract negotiations. 57 Stanley was seeking a contract equal to
that of the men's basketball coach, George Raveling, and USC was unwilling
to pay this amount. 58
Stanley filed suit against USC seeking reinstatement to her former position
and an increased salary, among other things.5 9 Because Stanley was seeking
equal pay, the court set forth the legal standards that must be satisfied under
the EPA.60 After comparing the two coaching positions, the court concluded
that the two jobs were not substantially equal as required by the EPA. 61
Additionally, the court relied on the fact that Stanley did not have the same
experience or qualifications related to public relations and revenue generation
53. 13 F.3d 1313.
54. Id. at 1318.
55. Id. at 1313.
56. Id. at 1326.
57. Id. at 1316-18.
58. Stanley,13 F.3dat 1317.
59. Id. at 1318.
60. Id. at 1321.
61. Id. at 1323.
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as Raveling.62 Finally, the court found that the difference in pay was justified
because of "significant differences in job pressure, the level of responsibility,
and in marketing and revenue-producing qualifications and performance" and
therefore the EPA was not violated.63 As a result, the court concluded that
Stanley had not proven a likelihood of success on the merits and affirmed the
district court's denial of Stanley's preliminary injunction motion. 64
Stanley II is the Ninth Circuit's decision affirming the district court's
summary judgment in favor of USC on all of Stanley's claims, including equal
pay.65 Reviewing the same facts examined in Stanley I, in the light most
favorable to Stanley, the court found no issues of material fact regarding any
issues asserted by Stanley. 66 The court applied the EPA's substantially equal
analysis to Stanley's equal pay claims; however, it did not resolve the issue of
whether the jobs were substantially equal. 67  Rather, the court found it
undisputed that Raveling had greater experience and qualifications and these
were valid "factors other than sex" justifying the pay disparity.68 The court
arrived at this decision based on the following facts: Raveling had thirty-one
years coaching experience, coached a men's Olympic basketball team, was
national coach of the year twice and PAC-10 coach of the year twice, had nine
years of marketing and promotional experience, and authored books on
basketball.69  In contrast, Stanley had only seventeen years of coaching
experience prior to coaching at USC, she never coached an Olympic team,
never published a book about basketball, and had no marketing or promotional
experience outside of what she learned as a coach. 70 The court found that
Stanley failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to this defense and
granted summary judgment in favor of USC.7 1
While Stanley's lawsuits were unsuccessful, as the next two cases show
other female coaches have brought successful gender-based wage
discrimination claims.
62. Id. at 1321-22.
63. 13 F.3d at 1326.
64. Id.
65. Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1022 (1999)
[hereinafter Stanley 1].
66. Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 2, at 365-66.
67. Stanley, 178 F.3d at 1074-75.
68. Id. at 1075.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1077.
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B. Perdue v. City of New York 72
Molly Perdue, "former women's basketball coach and women's sports
administrator at Brooklyn College, brought suit against Brooklyn College
[and] the City University of New York" (collectively CUNY) alleging gender
discrimination on a variety of theories including violations of the EPA and
Title VII.73 In 1997, a jury found "willful violation of the EPA" and
intentional discrimination in violation of Title VII. 74 CUNY moved for
judgment as a matter of law for insufficiency of evidence regarding the EPA
and Title VII intentional discrimination verdicts and for a new trial. 75
To establish that her unequal wages were due to discrimination, Perdue
provided substantial evidence about her responsibilities as the women's
basketball coach and women's sports administrator.76 Perdue used men's
basketball coach Rob Kestenbaum and men's sports administrator Mark
Reiner as comparators. 77 The court found that Perdue proved that her job was
substantially equal to the job performed by each of these men. 78  In
comparison to Kestenbaum, Perdue coached "the same season, the same
number of games, the same number of players, and the same number of
practices." 79 In addition, both were responsible for recruiting and managing
"team budgets, scholarships, assistant coaches, scouting of opponents, game
preparation, and ordering of equipment ... [and] the supervision, guidance,
and counseling of athletes, and for team conduct. 80 The court also found that
there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's determination that Perdue
performed the equivalent duties as the women's sports administrator as Reiner
did as the men's sports administrator.81 The approximate salaries of Perdue,
Kestenbaum, and Reiner, respectively, from 1990 to 1992, were: $43,000,
$40,000, and $70,000.82 Despite performing a job substantially equal to both
Kestenbaum and Reiner combined, her salary was more than $66,000 less than
their combined salaries each year.83  The court concluded that there was
72. 13 F. Supp. 2d 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
73. Id. at 330.
74. Id. at 331.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 333-34.
77. Perdue, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 333-34.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Perdue, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 341.
83. Id.
2002]
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sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Perdue had established a
prima facie case under the EPA. Specifically, "she performed equal work on
jobs requiring equal skill, effort and responsibility as those performed by both
Kestenbaum and Reiner, under similar working conditions, for less pay."
84
The court also found sufficient evidence to support the finding that CUNY's
EPA violation was willful. 8
5
Next, examining the validity of Perdue's Title VII intentional
discrimination claim, the court stated that Perdue must show that "'she was
treated less favorably than comparable male employees in circumstances from
which a gender-based motive could be inferred. ' '86. The court found the
record to be "replete" with evidence sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict that
CUNY intentionally discriminated against Perdue because of her sex in
violation of Title VII. 87 Additionally, the court found that the evidence
supporting Perdue's EPA claim also related to her Title VII intentional
discrimination claim.88 As a result of Perdue's favorable jury verdict, she was
awarded $85,000 in compensatory damages pursuant to Title VII, $134,829 in
back pay, and $134,829 in liquidated damages (based on the willfulness
finding) pursuant to the EPA, plus attorney's fees and costs provided for by
both the EPA and Title VII.89
C. Lowrey v. Texas A&M University System9°
Jan Lowrey, former women's basketball coach at Tarleton State
University (TSU), filed a lawsuit against TSU (part of the Texas A&M
University system) alleging gender discrimination in pay under the EPA and
Title VII and retaliation under Title VII and Title IX.91 The district court
denied TSU's motion for summary judgment on Lowrey's claims of pay
discrimination under Title VII and the EPA, finding issues of material fact
existed on these claims.92 The disputed issue was whether Lowrey received
equal pay while employed as Women's Athletic Coordinator. 93 Lowrey
compared her job to Jim Johnson. Each served as Women's and Men's
84. Id. at 334.
85. Id. at 335.
86. Id. (quoting Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 1997).
87. Perdue, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 336.
88. Id.
89. Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 2, at 374.
90. 11 F. Supp. 2d 895 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
91. Id. at902-03.
92. Id. at 921.
93. Id. at 908.
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Athletics Coordinator, respectively, head coach, and instructor.94 The court
considered Lowrey's EPA and Title VII unequal pay claims together because
of their similarity. 95  Lowrey presented evidence that Johnson received
increased pay when he received the Athletic Coordinator position, but that
Lowrey did not receive such a pay increase when she received her Athletic
Coordinator position. 96 In addition, the evidence showed that Johnson was
paid from the Athletics Administration Budget but that Lowrey was not, even
though they held similar positions. 97 As a result of contrary interpretation of
the evidence, the court found that factual issues existed regarding the equality
of Lowrey's compensation for being Women's Athletic Coordinator.
98
Therefore, the court denied summary judgment on Lowrey's pay
discrimination claims.99
Many other coaches have brought gender-based wage discrimination
claims; however, like Stanley, their claims are often unsuccessful because
institutions have found great success in raising the affirmative defense that
"factors other than sex," specifically revenue raising, justify the pay
disparity. 100 Perdue and Lowrey's favorable decisions can be distinguished
from Stanley and other unsuccessful pay equity suits; revenue generation was
not raised as a justification for the pay disparity because neither the men's nor
women's team generated revenue. For the most part, the statutes that apply to
pay equity claims have not been successful in alleviating the pay disparity
among coaches of men's and women's teams. The EEOC believes that the
courts have engaged in an incomplete analysis of these laws and
misconceptions are often raised when considering the reasons for the pay
disparities. 10  As a result, the EEOC has issued guidelines to clarify how the
EPA and Title VII apply to gender-based pay disparities.1
0 2
IV. THE EEOC GUIDELINES
In 1997, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued Notice
915.002, entitled "Enforcement Guidance on Sex Discrimination in the
Compensation of Sports Coaches in Educational Institutions (EEOC
94. Id.
95. Lowrey, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 906.
96. Id. at 908.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 909.
99. Id. at 921.
100. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 7, at II.A.3.
101. Id. at 1.
102. Id.
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Guidelines)."' 10 3 The purpose of the EEOC Guidelines is to set forth the
Commission's position regarding the application of the EPA and Title VII to
gender-based wage discrimination claims brought by intercollegiate
coaches.'1 4 The reasons for drafting the EEOC Guidelines involved concerns
by the EEOC that overall employment of coaches in educational institutions is
not gender neutral and that where courts have applied Title VII and the EPA to
gender-based wage discrimination claims, there has been an incomplete
analysis of the law. 105
The EEOC Guidelines begin by setting forth statistics illustrating pay
disparities among the coaches of men's and women's teams in educational
institutions. 10 6 The Guidelines then set forth a detailed legal analysis of how
the EEOC interprets the EPA in claims brought by coaches, including
examples illustrating various factual situations involving pay disparities that
may or may not violate the EPA. 10 7 Further discussion of how the EEOC
interprets EPA violations is discussed below. Finally, the EEOC briefly
discusses equal pay claims under Title VII. Essentially, if the Title VII claim
is only for unequal pay, the same burdens of proof apply, as well as the same
affirmative defenses.'0 8 The EEOC recognized the importance of "carefully"
analyzing the "unique facts" of each case to determine whether the "actual
duties" performed by the compared coaches "justify unequal pay."10 9 The
EEOC Guidelines stand to have the greatest impact on pay equity claims by
placing greater burdens on defendant educational institutions.1 10
A. Are the Jobs Substantially Equal?
Based on the belief that courts sometimes consider improper factors when
determining if the jobs are substantially equal, the EEOC sought to clarify this
element of an EPA claim. First, when determining whether pay discrimination
exists, the "jobs should be analyzed functionally," comparing actual job
requirements, not just the skills being taught."I ' As a result, jobs coaching
different sports can be "substantially equal" under the EPA and can be
103. Id. at I; see also Narol & Martin, supra note 3 1, at 179-89.
104. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 7, at 1.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at I.A.
108. Id. at l.B.
109. Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 2, at 376.
110. Narol & Martin, supra note 31, at 180.
111. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 7, at II.
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"appropriate comparators" under Title VII.112  Second, institutions have
successfully justified pay differentials by relying on terms and conditions of
employment and market values to establish that the jobs were not
"substantially equal."' 13 The EEOC will not recognize this defense unless the
institution can prove that the pay differential in question is not a result of
institutional or societal discrimination.
114
The EEOC Guidelines seek to promote "equality of opportunity."'" 5 To
achieve this goal, the Guidelines clarify the EPA analysis. For example, when
determining if jobs are substantially equal, the equal skills considered must
focus only on the skills "necessary to perform the job," not additional training,
education or abilities that a coach may have but are not required to perform the
job. 116 Also, when determining whether a job is substantially equal based on
equality of opportunity, the EEOC will consider if the institution has given
male and female coaches the opportunity to have equal responsibilities.
117
B. Applicability of Affirmative Defenses
The EEOC believes that "factor other than sex" affirmative defenses are
questionable when applied to coaching cases. 118 Therefore, the Guidelines
seek to clarify what these factors are and in what instances they can and
cannot be used to justify pay disparities.
The "factor other than sex" defenses discussed by the Guidelines
include: (1) the "revenue" defense, which enables an institution to
justify a pay disparity by arguing that the male coach generates more
revenue than the female coach; (2) the "marketplace" defense,
whereby an institution justifies pay disparities by arguing that it must
pay a particular coach more in order to compete in the marketplace for
this coach; (3) the "prior salary" defense, whereby institutions place
reliance on prior salary in determining the appropriate current salary
level; (4) the "sex-of-athletes" defense, which involves an institution's
tying of levels of compensation to the sex of the athletes being
coached; (5) the "prior experience" defense, which enables a school to
justify pay disparities based on the particular coach's prior experience,
112. Id.
113. Narol & Martin, supra note 31, at 180.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 180-81.
117. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 7, at II.A.2.c.
118. Narol & Martin, supra note 31, at 182.
2002]
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education and ability; and (6) the "additional duties" defense, which
allows a pay disparity to exist where one coach is paid more for
performing additional job-related duties. 119
The Guidelines have the greatest impact on the "revenue," "marketplace,"
and "prior salary" defenses. The EEOC more closely examines whether the
amount of revenue that a coach or team produces can justify the pay
discrepancy. 120 The EEOC recognizes that many variables outside of the
institution's control actually affect the amount of revenue produced. 121 The
Commission noted studies that indicate that, both historically and currently,
women's athletic programs have received significantly fewer resources than
men's athletic programs. 122 As a result, the EEOC places a "heavy burden" on
the institution to show that the revenue defense is not related to societal or
institutional discrimination. 123  If an institution provides discriminatorily-
reduced support to aid a female coach in revenue production for her team, the
pay disparity cannot be justified by "factors other than sex." 124
The EEOC Guidelines provide an example where a university pays a
men's basketball coach fifty percent more than the women's basketball
coach. 125 The university justifies the pay disparity as a factor other than sex
because the men's coach raised substantially greater revenue.' 26 However, an
investigation proves that the university provides significantly greater support
to the men's coach to assist him in revenue raising. 127 The additional support
includes additional staff for the purpose of handling marketing and
promotional activities and a greater budget for paid advertising. 128  In
comparison, the women's coach did not receive additional staff or funds. 129
According to the EEOC Guidelines, despite the lesser revenue generated by
the female coach, revenue is not a factor other than sex that the institution can
rely upon to justify pay differences because the women's coach was not
provided equivalent support by the institution to aid her revenue raising
119. Id. at 182-83.
120. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 7, at II.A.3.a.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Narol & Martin, supra note 31, at 183.
124. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 7, at II.A.3.a.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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efforts. 130
In addition, the EEOC Guidelines warn against problems arising from
asserting that market value justifies pay differentials. 131 The EEOC's concern
is that the marketplace may not be gender-neutral. 132 The Guidelines state that
"[s]ex discrimination in the marketplace which results in lower pay for jobs
done by women will not support the marketplace value defense." 133  The
EEOC will only consider this defense if the institution can establish that it
evaluated the marketplace value of the specific job's characteristics and the
differing salaries are not based on sex.134
The EEOC Guidelines also express concern regarding the viability of the
"[e]mployee's [p]rior [s]alary" defense. 135  The Guidelines indicate that
relying on prior salary may "perpetuate" the cycle of women traditionally
being paid lower salary due to sex discrimination. 136 Specifically regarding
athletic programs, there is concern that wages are not based on normal market
value, but rather on non-economic "cultural and societal factors."'
137
According to the Guidelines, an institution asserting this defense must prove it
conducted a thorough investigation when considering the coach's salary.
138
The investigation should include consulting the previous employer to
determine starting and final salaries and a determination of the prior salary's
accuracy in relation to the coach's abilities, education, and experience.
139
Also, the institution must not rely solely on a coach's prior salary in
determining the current salary. 1
40
C. The Legal Effects of the EEOC Guidelines
In order to seriously consider the impact that the EEOC Guidelines can
have on the issue of gender-based wage discrimination, one must first
determine how the courts treat a federal agency's guidelines. Historically,
when a federal agency is responsible for enforcing a statute, the courts give
"considerable deference" to the agency's interpretation of the statute as long as
130. Id.
131. Id. at II.A.3.b.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at II.A.3.c.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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the "interpretation is reasonable and consistent with the statute's purpose."' 141
In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, the Supreme Court considered
the weight of authority that should be afforded EEOC Guidelines relating to
sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII. 142
The Court determined that because the Guidelines were an "'administrative
interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency," 143 the Guidelines
""'constitute[d] a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts
and litigants may properly resort for guidance .... 144
The Office of Civil Rights (OCR), the body responsible for enforcing Title
IX, issued the "Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Interpretation"'145 (Policy
Interpretation), which is similar to the EEOC issuing the Coaching Guidelines.
The Policy Interpretation issued by OCR clarified the Title IX regulatory
requirements for athletic programs. Specifically, the Policy Interpretation
divided athletics into three major categories under which to be analyzed for
compliance.14
6
In Cohen v. Brown University,147 the district court recognized that even
though a policy interpretation has no legal effect, it should be afforded
"substantial deference," especially where it is a "considered" document. 148 In
reviewing the decision, the First Circuit agreed with the district court's
conclusion that policy interpretations are entitled "substantial deference" and
added that they may be afforded "controlling weight under an appropriate
circumstance."1 49
Many courts have used the three-part test set forth in the Policy
Interpretation to determine compliance with Title IX. 150 As a result, Title IX
has resulted in increased athletic participation by women.
141. Narol & Martin, supra note 31, at 187.
142. 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
143. Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971)).
144. Id. (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))).
145. 44 Fed. Reg. 71413 (Dec. 11, 1979).
146. Id.
147. 101 F.3d 155 (lstCir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1469 (1997).
148. Narol & Martin, supra note 31, at 187. "The Policy Interpretation in Cohen was a
considered document in that it was published for public comment, received more than 700 comments,
was published after agency investigation of universities, and provided a period of time during which
Congress could disapprove of the Interpretation." Id. at 187-88.
149. Id. at 188.
150. RAY YASSER ET AL., SPORTS LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 156 (4th ed. 2000); see, e.g.,
Homer v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994); Pederson v. La. State Univ., 912
F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993).
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The purpose of the EEOC Guidelines can be compared to that of OCR's
Policy Interpretation. The EEOC Guidelines seek to clarify the application of
the EPA and Title VII to pay disparity for athletic coaches in educational
institutions.1 51 The goal of the EEOC Guidelines is to provide "equality of
opportunity" to all coaches. 152 Because the EEOC is trying to remedy the
historically different compensation paid to coaches of men's and women's
teams, the Guidelines are consistent with the purposes of the EPA and Title
VII. 153 As a result, the Guidelines, like the Policy Interpretation, should be
considered by courts when analyzing pay equity claims. Perhaps then the
coaches of women's teams will begin to receive equal pay.
V. ANALYSIS
This section begins by looking at the Stanley cases from the perspective of
the EEOC. Next, it will address the problems that arise in using revenue
production to justify pay disparities among male and female coaches. Finally,
recommendations will be set forth for coaches who bring gender-based wage
discrimination claims.
A. Assessing the Weaknesses of the Analysis Applied in Stanley l and II and
how the EEOC Guidelines may have Impacted the Decision
In Stanley I, the court concluded that Stanley and Raveling did not have
substantially equal jobs. 154 In arriving at that conclusion, the court mistakenly
considered differences in skills that were not related to the performance of
coaching. For example, the court noted that Raveling is a best-selling author
and an actor, and found these skills to mean Raveling could draw more media
attention. 155 However, authoring a best-selling book or acting are not skills
imperative to performing the requirements of a coaching job.
The EEOC Guidelines provide an example specifically addressing this
issue. The example involved the coaches of men's and women's tennis, both
of whom had the same abilities and experiences except that the men's coach
also hosted a radio show unrelated to tennis. 156 The Guidelines state that the
simple fact that the men's tennis coach possesses the ability to host a radio talk
show does not demonstrate that the coaches' job skills are not "substantially
151. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 7, at I.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1323.
155. Id. at 1321-22.
156. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 7, at II.A.2.a.
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equal."' 157 The required skills for a tennis coach do not include the ability to
host a radio show and therefore that cannot be a skill that is considered to
justify paying the male coach a higher salary.
In addition, in Stanley I, the court failed to recognize that Stanley had job
responsibilities that were equal to Raveling's responsibilities, including
coaching, discipline, recruiting, advising athletes, and managing the team.
Instead, the court relied heavily on the fact that Raveling's position required
more pressure to raise revenue. 158 In Stanley II, Stanley argued that any
differences in the men's and women's coaching positions were based on
previous gender-based decisions by the University and therefore should not be
relied on to conclude that the jobs are "substantially different." 159  In a
footnote, the court acknowledged the EEOC Guidelines which explicitly state
that "'pay discrimination cannot be justified if the differences relied on for the
proposition that the two jobs are substantially equal are themselves based on
discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment.' '"160 However, the
court declined to answer the question of whether the coaching jobs are
substantially equal and ignored the possible discriminatory terms of Stanley's
employment. Instead, the court granted summary judgment to the University,
finding the pay differential was based on experience, education, and ability as
a factor other than sex. 161 The dissent recognized that the majority opinion
ignored the gender discrimination by USC that faced the women's basketball
program:
By focusing on the differences between Stanley's and Raveling's
qualifications, the majority skips over the many ways in which gender
discrimination insidiously affected the University's treatment of the
women's basketball program and Stanley as its Head Coach. The
University's half-hearted promotion of the women's basketball
program, its intensive marketing of the men's basketball program, and
the formidable obstacles Stanley faced as a woman athlete in a male-
dominated profession contributed to this disparate treatment. 162
The dissent recognized the EEOC's concern that societal and institutional
gender discrimination cannot underlie the institution's proffered justifications
for pay differentials.
157. Id.
158. Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1321.
159. Stanley, 178 F.3d at 1074-75.
160. Id. at 1075 n. 1 (quoting EEOC Guidelines, supra note 7, at II).
161. Id. at 1075-77.
162. Id. at 1080.
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B. Problems Using Revenue Production to Justify Pay Differentials
Institutions are often successful in asserting that revenue production and
the increased pressure on coaches of men's teams justify their greater pay. 163
Revenue production and pressure arguments are used either to show that
coaching a men's team and a women's team are "substantially different" or as
a factor other than sex justifying paying coaches of a men's team more than
the coach of a women's team. The basis of this justification is that the men's
coaches are under greater pressure to generate revenue and often do produce
more revenue in terms of ticket sales and promotions than the coach of a
women's team. 164  While this may be a successful argument in some
instances, there are several potential problems with the revenue production and
pressure argument.
First, the EEOC Guidelines suggest that the defense of revenue as a
"factor other than sex" may be suspect. In Stanley I, the court recognized that
revenue generation can justify greater pay. 165 The court found significant the
fact that the men's basketball team produced ninety times more revenue than
the women's team. 166 According to the EEOC Guidelines, revenue cannot be
a factor other than sex justifying pay disparity unless a university has provided
the women's coach with an equivalent amount of support to assist her in
raising revenue. 167 A court relying on the EEOC Guidelines may find that the
real reason for the substantial difference in revenue raised by each coach was a
lack of support for women's revenue raising efforts. In light of the EEOC
Guidelines, one way for plaintiffs such as Stanley to strengthen their pay
discrimination claim is to gather evidence demonstrating how a university
supports revenue raising efforts.
Second, revenue production is often determined by factors other than the
effort put forth by a coach, which may result from discrimination.
Historically, men's sports have been received differently by society at-large,
which can account for the greater attendance and revenue from men's sporting
events. 168 In addition, the manner in which many schools support their men's
(specifically basketball and football) programs can impact the revenue
generated.
163. See, e.g., Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1322; Bartges v. Univ. of N.C. at Charlotte, 908 F. Supp. 1312,
1327 (W.D.N.C. 1995), ajfd mern., 94 F.3d 641 (1996); Deli v. Univ. of Minn., 863 F. Supp. 958,
961 (D. Minn. 1994).
164. Claussen, supra note 52, at 166-67; Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1321.
165. Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1323.
166. Id.
167. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 7, at II.A.3.a.
168. Claussen, supra note 52, at 167.
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As long as male sports are enhanced by attendance of cheerleaders,
bands, pep squads, the press.., scheduled [at] prime time [and] at the
most convenient locations, girls' sports will not be their equal. Thus
pressure and the number of spectators may be directly related to the
unequal treatment of the two programs. 1
69
The unequal treatment received by women's sports, historically, is a
critical reason why women's sports have less attendance and generate
significantly less revenue. An institution should not be allowed to use the
effects of past discrimination as a justification for disparate pay today.
Another problem with relying on revenue to justify pay disparity for
college coaches is that intercollegiate athletics are supposed to be an "integral
part of the educational program."'170 The focus of intercollegiate athletics is
supposed to be on the educational experience and not the amount of money
generated by a program, team, or coach. If one considers education and
amateurism to be the primary purpose of college athletics, it does not seem
appropriate to place such significance on the amount of revenue a coach
generates when evaluating salaries. Institutions should be committed to
pursuing the "amateur-education" model of sport. 171  In this sense, the
athlete's focus is the development of "leadership and teamwork skills" and the
coaches are instrumental in imparting these lessons. 172 In order to reduce pay
disparity among coaches of men's and women's teams, institutions must
remember the fundamental purpose of intercollegiate athletics is amateurism
and education, not the commercialized, revenue-generating machine it has
become. The return to the amateur-education school of thought may help to
reduce unequal salaries based on the amount of revenue generated.
Courts and institutions should not assume that pay differentials among
male and female coaches can be justified on the basis of revenue generation.
Courts should adopt the EEOC Guidelines because they seek to promote the
underlying policies and purposes of Title VII and the EPA.
One of the purposes of Title VII is to eliminate "discriminatory treatment
based on gender." 173 In addition, the objective of Title VII is to "remove
barriers that have operated in the past" resulting in favoring male employees
over female employees. 174 The purpose of the EPA is to eliminate "subjective
169. Id.
170. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AS'N, 2001-02 NCAA Division III Manual § 1.3.1 (Michael
V. Earle ed., 2001).
171. Giampetro-Meyer, supra note 2, at 386.
172. Id.
173. Narol & Martin, supra note 31, at 188.
174. Id.
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assumptions and traditional stereotyped misconceptions regarding the value of
women's work."' 175 The EEOC Guidelines support these policy objectives by
recognizing the need to look at what underlies proffered justifications for pay
disparities. 17 6 The EEOC Guidelines limit the strength of the factors other
than sex defense by placing the burden on the defense to show that factors
based on sex are not truly motivating pay differences. 177 For example, the
EEOC would not allow the defense of revenue generation as a factor other
than sex to justify unequal pay where the institution has discriminated against
women's sports by not providing funding comparable to that of men's sports
for promotion and revenue generation. 178 Institutions could be providing
decreased funds to support female programs based on traditional assumptions
and misconceptions regarding the value of women's sport; specifically, the
assumption that men's sports are better or more valuable than women's sports,
which is inconsistent with the policy' of the EPA. Additionally, decreased
funding for women's sports compared with men's sports is inconsistent with
Title IX.
The major barrier to female coaches' pay equity claims is the revenue
generation defense. The EEOC Guidelines provide the best weapon to weaken
this defense by placing greater burdens on the institutions to prove these
defenses are not motivated by institutional or societal discrimination. By
limiting the effectiveness of these defenses, more coaches may begin to
prevail in pay equity claims.
C. Recommendations for Coaches Bringing Gender-Based Discrimination
Claims
The EEOC Guidelines, by providing examples of substantially equal jobs
and when affirmative defenses are acceptable, help a plaintiff-coach to better
understand his or her rights under the EPA and Title VII and should enable
coaches to bring stronger claims under these statutes. Additionally, successful
pay discrimination cases such as Perdue and Lowrey provide guidance for
successful claims. Relying on the EEOC Guidelines and recognizing
successful strategies by former plaintiffs, the following are suggestions that
may strengthen a female coach's gender-based wage discrimination claim.
First, the plaintiff must be sure to bring his or her claim under the
appropriate statute. For example, if the coach believes the pay discrimination
175. Id.
176. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 7, at II.A.3.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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is based on the gender of the team coached rather than on the gender of the
coach, the claim should be brought under Title IX. It is important to
remember that the EEOC Guidelines are based on a claim brought under either
the EPA or Title VII; these are the claims that are the primary focus of this
comment. Title VII and the EPA prohibit discrimination based on the coach's
gender. 179 Therefore, courts have found that if the plaintiff is not being
discriminated against based on his or her gender, but rather the gender of the
team coached, a Title VII violation has not occurred.' 80 Because the Title IX
athletic provisions "focus on the sex of the team as a relevant concem," this
statute is likely to be more useful to a coach who believes he or she is being
discriminated against solely because of his or her team's gender. If the claim
is brought under the EPA or Title VII, but there is no showing that the coach
was discriminated against based on his or her gender, the claim will be
dismissed. In order to reach the merits of the case, the plaintiff must state a
claim under the appropriate statute.
Second, coaches must select the appropriate comparator coach. The
comparator's job must be "substantially equal" under the EPA or comparable
for purposes of Title VII. 18 1 However, it is important to remember that the
comparator need not coach the same or similar sport because the duties are the
focus, not the sport coached. 182  Factors that should be similar include
education, experience, size of the team coached, and size of the staff. 183
Third, coaches should provide complete and detailed information on the
duties performed by each coach. The actual duties performed are used to
determine if the job responsibilities are substantially equal. The duties
performed are more important than the comparator's job title in assessing
equal responsibilities. In her successful pay discrimination claim, Molly
Perdue provided extensive evidence regarding her duties and responsibilities
to prove that she performed a job substantially equal to her male
comparators. 184
Fourth, if the "factor other than sex" affirmative defense is asserted, the
plaintiff should try to show that these justifications are actually tied to societal
or institutional discrimination. If so, the justifications will not defeat pay
179. Claussen, supra note 52, at 151.
180. Deli, 863 F. Supp. at 960; Kenneweg v. Hampton Township Sch. Dist., 438 F. Supp. 575,
577 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Jackson v. Armstrong Sch. Dist., 430 F. Supp. 1050, 1052 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
181. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 7, at lII.
182. Id.
183. Osborne & Yarbrough, supra note 25, at 248-49.
184. Perdue, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 333.
[Vol. 13:149
2002] PAY EQUITY FOR INTERCOLLEGIATE COACHES 171
discrimination claims. 185  For example, if the defense raised is revenue
generation as a factor other than sex, the plaintiff should examine how the
institution supports the men's and women's team. If the institution raises the
defense of the coach's prior salary to justify the unequal compensation, the
plaintiff should try to determine if there was bargaining involved in the male
coach's higher salary and if there was any investigation by the university
regarding the coach's prior salary and the basis therefore. 186
VI. CONCLUSION
Generally, the EPA and Title VII have not been effective in eliminating
pay discrimination for intercollegiate coaches. However, the EEOC
Guidelines have the potential to greatly benefit female coaches if adopted or
given deference by the courts because they specifically address the most
common defenses put forth by institutions and increase their burden in
justifying pay disparities. The EEOC Guidelines seek to remedy gender-based
wage discrimination by identifying societal gender discrimination that may be
underlying the institution's justifications for unequal pay. Because the EEOC
Guidelines are consistent with the purpose and policy of the EPA and Title
VII, they should at least be persuasive authority for courts analyzing coaches'
claims of unequal pay. If courts begin to rely on the Guidelines, female
coaches seeking equal pay may find greater success.
MICHELLE R. WEISS
185. EEOC Guidelines, supra note 7, at II.A.3.
186. Id. at II.A.3.c.
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